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Coincidences: A fundamental consequence of rational cognition
- Type
- Study
- By
- Thomas L. Griffiths and Joshua B. Tenenbaum
- Journal
- New Ideas in Psychology
- Published
- 2015
A landmark paper showing that coincidence judgments fall directly out of rational Bayesian inference — the brain treats improbable matches as evidence for hidden causes.
Thomas Griffiths and Joshua Tenenbaum are two of the most influential cognitive scientists of their generation, and their 2015 paper in New Ideas in Psychology made a provocative claim: coincidence judgments fall directly out of rational inference. A brain that weighs evidence properly will treat an improbable match as a reason to suspect a hidden cause.
That reframing is the paper's lasting contribution. Experiencing coincidence is not a glitch in a well-working mind — it is what a well-working mind is supposed to do. It leaves the question of what, if anything, the coincidence signals entirely open, while dismantling the idea that the feeling itself is irrational.
Coincidences are a fundamental consequence of rational cognition.
The meaning
It shows the experience of meaningful coincidence is a feature of a well-working mind, not a glitch — which leaves room for the question of what, if anything, it signals.
The skeptic
The paper demonstrates that finding coincidence meaningful requires no paranormal mechanism at all: it is what a rational mind is supposed to do.
About the research
Cognitive scientists (Princeton and MIT) who model how the mind reasons about probability and surprise.
Key takeaways
- Argues coincidence detection is a rational consequence of how the brain weighs evidence.
- Models the feeling of surprise as Bayesian inference.
- Widely cited as the strongest cognitive-science account of coincidence.